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Abstract 
Background 
Recent findings show that (previously) depressed and traumatised patients, compared to 
controls, make more frequently use of an observer perspective (as set against a field 
perspective) when retrieving memories. Because patients with borderline personality disorder 
(BPD) often report mood disturbances and past traumatic experiences, it would be plausible 
to expect that these patients too would retrieve higher proportions of observer memories. 
Therefore, and given the phenotypical variance of BPD, we examined whether vantage 
perspective during recall is associated with one or more BPD symptom clusters. 
Methods 
A community sample consisting of 148 volunteers (66 males) completed the 
Autobiographical Memory Test, the Borderline Syndrome Index, and the Depression Scale of 
the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales. 
Results 
Interpersonal and anxious-neurotic BPD features were associated with higher proportions of 
observer memories. 
Conclusions 
The proportion of observer memories was not associated with the total number of BPD 
symptoms. Nevertheless, our data suggest the existence of substantial connections between 
perspective taking during recall on the one hand and interpersonal difficulties and anxious-
neurotic symptoms on the other hand, especially following cues that tap into domains that are 
highly discrepant towards one’s actual self-concept. 
Keywords 
Borderline personality disorder, Autobiographical memory, Vantage perspective, Imagery 
perspective, Self-discrepancy 
Background 
“Autobiographical memory (AM) is the aspect of memory that is concerned with the 
recollection of personally experienced past events” [1], p. 122. It is believed to function as a 
kind of database of previous experiences on which we rely to find problem solving strategies 
when we experience difficulties [2], and it is thought to play an important role in the 
construction of our self-concept and in goal oriented behaviour [3]. It should not surprise, 
therefore, that problems with AM are found to be associated with emotional difficulties as 
major depressive disorder (MDD; [4]) and post-traumatic stress-disorder (PTSD; [4]). Recent 
findings [5,6] reveal that depressed and traumatised patients differ from healthy controls with 
respect to the perspective they adopt while retrieving memories. Patients diagnosed with 
borderline personality disorder (BPD) frequently complain about depressive episodes and 
they often report past traumatic experiences [7]. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that people 
high on BPD complaints would show similar AM disturbances as depressed and traumatised 
patients. To our knowledge, vantage perspective has not been studied in relation to BPD 
symptoms hitherto. In this paper, we study the relationship between vantage perspective 
during retrieval and borderline complaints as measured in a community sample. 
In general, most recollections are spontaneously remembered from one’s original point of 
view, as if one again ‘sees’ the situation through one’s own eyes (i.e., field perspective) [8]. 
Nevertheless, some memories are remembered while ‘seeing’ the situation as an observer 
might have seen it, also seeing oneself act in the situation (i.e., observer perspective or ‘fly on 
the wall’ perspective). Field memories are generally experienced as more emotional and 
detailed, whereas in observer mode one is more likely to focus on the objective circumstances 
than on the affective elements [9-12] – but see also [13] for less straightforward findings and 
interpretations. Traumatised and (formerly) depressed patients tend to retrieve larger 
proportions of observer memories compared to controls (in traumatised patients: e.g., [9]; in 
currently depressed patients: e.g., [14]; in previously depressed patients: e.g., [15]). 
According to Kuyken and Moulds [14], there are at least two possibly compatible accounts 
that give rise to higher proportions of observer memories in depressed and traumatised 
patients. First, Kuyken and Moulds [14] suggest that observer memories are used when one 
evaluates oneself, or when one needs to compare the actual self with a former or future self 
[16,17]. Disappointments about goals that have not been attained and discrepancies between 
one’s actual self and one’s ideal self may lead to dejecting schemas about the self [18]. Such 
schemas may threaten the stability of the self. In order to prevent a reactive crash of the self, 
the Working Self, which is responsible for maintaining an integrated sense of self [3,19,20], 
specifically searches for information that is in line with the initial thoughts about the self. 
Hence, the organism is driven to evaluate oneself over and over, thereby using observer 
memories repeatedly. As expected, Kuyken and Moulds [14] found positive correlations 
between the number of observer memories on the one hand and levels of self-evaluation on 
the other (also see [21]). 
Second, following McIsaac and Eich [11], Kuyken and Moulds [14] suggest that the 
recollection of more observer memories may function as a cognitive functional avoidance 
strategy: The adoption of an observer perspective then, at least on the short term, prevents 
one from getting overwhelmed by intense and possibly painful emotions associated with 
intrusive memories that are common in depression and PTSD. Indeed, both clinical 
observations and research data [5,11,22,23] show that PTSD patients tend to report about 
their traumatic experiences while adopting an observer perspective, suggesting that the 
observer perspective may be adaptive in regulating, or at least dampening, one’s emotions. 
Furthermore, higher proportions of observer memories are found to be associated with 
outcomes on different avoidance measures (in depressed participants: e.g., [14,24]; in 
traumatised participants: e.g., [11,25]), again suggesting that the observer perspective may be 
an avoidance strategy. 
Following the established associations between the use of an observer perspective during 
recall and MDD/PTSD, and given the presence of trauma and associated (painful) emotions, 
affect instability, and difficulties regarding the stability of the self in BPD patients (e.g., [26], 
but see also the BPD criteria in DSM-IV, [4]), we hypothesised that BPD features would be 
positively associated with the frequency of observer memories. Additionally, we explored the 
role of self-discrepancy in relation to vantage perspective during recall. 
Methods 
Participants 
Hundred forty eight participants (66 males), all between 17 and 30 years of age (M = 21.34; 
SD = 3.22) participated and were recruited by the second author, Jasmin Reza, using her 
personal social network and its extensions (convenience sampling). The majority (60.2%) 
held a high school diploma, 11.5% held college level degrees, and 14.9% held master level 
degrees. 
Instruments 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT, [27]; Dutch written minimal instructions version 
with adaptation towards the concept of discrepancy, [28]). In a first phase participants 
were presented with 20 cue words. Clinicians had judged half of these cues to be high 
discrepant (HD) for depressed patients, whereas the other half was not (i.e. low discrepant, 
LD; for details, see [28]), but all cues had a positive valence. HD and LD cues were 
alternated, starting with a LD cue: polite, happy, honest, enjoying, just, optimistic, respectful, 
energetic, sincere, satisfied, intelligent, pleasurable, neat, self-assured, sensitive, relaxed, 
grateful, successful, reliable, and active. Respondents were instructed to write down 
autobiographical memories in response to each of the cues that were orally presented. Time 
limits were set at one minute per cue. 
In a second phase participants were asked to go over their responses again and to judge 
vantage point of the retrieved memories by scoring each memory as ‘p1’ (being a field 
memory or memory retrieved from a 1st person perspective), or ‘p3’ (being an observer 
memory or a memory retrieved from a 3rd person perspective). Occasionally, respondents did 
not succeed to respond with a valid memory to a cue. These answers were coded as ‘No 
Response’ by the experimenters afterwards. Respondents were also asked to rate their 
memories with respect to memory specificity, but these data go beyond the objective of this 
paper. Variable of interest is the total proportion of memories retrieved while using an 
observer perspective (%O). To compute %O, we only included the valid memories, excluding 
the answers coded as ‘No Response’. Therefore, %O is the complement of the proportion of 
field memories. The written AMT has been used successfully previously to assess memory 
specificity (e.g., [29,30]). 
Borderline Syndrome Index (BSI, [31]; Dutch translation, [32]). The BSI consists of 52 
items describing features and characteristics of BPD. Items are judged on presence, and 
should therefore be answered with ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Total scores range from 0 to 52, with higher 
scores reflecting greater levels of BPD pathology. Internal consistency in our sample was 
high, Cronbach’s alpha = .89, for the total score. A four factor model was revealed in the 
Dutch version [31]: Subscales measure Negative Self-Definition (NSD; 13 items, Cronbach’s 
alpha = .85), Difficult Interpersonal Relationships (DIR; 11 items, Cronbach’s alpha = .69), 
Failing Social Skills (FSS; 10 items, Cronbach’s alpha = .65), and Anxiety (ANX; 16 items, 
Cronbach’s alpha = .60). Convergent validity of the Dutch translation we used was found to 
be high, r = .75 (tested with the Diagnostic Interview for Borderline, [32]). 
Depression Anxiety Stress-Scales- Depression Scale (DASS21-D, [33]; Dutch version, 
[34]). We were only interested in the Depression subscale (7 items, Cronbach’s alpha = .81 in 
the present study) of this 21-item self-report questionnaire. Respondents should score every 
item by indicating on a 4-point Likert scale to what extent the content of the item applied to 
them over the past week, ranging from 0 (did not apply to me at all) to 3 (applied to me very 
much, or most of the time). Higher scores indicate higher symptom severity. Psychometric 
properties were found to be good [34]. 
Procedure 
This study was part of a larger study. Following written informed consent participants were 
invited to complete a battery of measures, including the ones described above, in the order 
presented above. Data administration was organised individually. Except for the AMT, no 
time limits were set. Most participants finished the test battery within one hour. This study is 
approved by the Ethical Committee of KU Leuven. 
Results 
Sample characteristics 
Table 1 includes the means, standard deviations, and ranges on all included variables. BPD 
complaints were limitedly reported (total BSI: M = 8.40, SD = 7.42, with a theoretical 
maximum score of 52), and depression severity (M = 3.32, SD = 3.56, with a theoretical 
maximum score of 21) scores were rather low. Thus, data are as expected in a community 
sample. 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the measures used 
 M SD Range 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT)    
     % O 27.77 .21 0.00 – 75.00 
     % O-HD 27.54 .23 0.00 – .80.00 
     % O-LD 27.78 .22 0.00 – .80.00 
     Total 4.11 .74 1.74 – 6.00 
Borderline Syndrome Index (BSI)    
     Negative Self-Definition (NSD) 1.59 2.47 .00 – 13.00 
     Difficult Interpersonal Relationships (DIR) 1.44 1.73 .00 – 10.00 
     Failing Social Skills (FSS) 2.31 1.97 .00 – 9.00 
     Anxiety (ANX) 2.77 2.42 .00 – 11.00 
     Total 8.40 7.42 .00 – 40.00 
Depression scale of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS21-D), total 3.32 3.56 0 – 17 
%O = proportion memories retrieved during full AMT administration using an observer perspective;%O-HD = proportion 
memories retrieved using an observer perspective following high discrepant AMT cues;%O-LD = proportion memories 
retrieved using an observer perspective following low discrepant AMT cues. 
The relationship between vantage perspective during recall and borderline 
symptoms 
Table 2 shows the correlations between the proportions of observer memories (in total as well 
as following high and low discrepant cues), and BPD symptom clusters as measured by the 
BSI. We controlled for depression severity (DASS21-D), to exclude that observed 
associations were solely due to shared associations with depressive symptoms, and for age, 
given that the proportion of observer memories was found to be significantly associated with 
participant’s age (see Table 3). The proportion of memories retrieved while using an observer 
perspective (%O) was not, as hypothesised, systematically associated with the total BSI 
score. 
Table 2 Correlations between proportions observer memories in total and following 
high and low discrepant cues, and borderline symptoms (BSI) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. % O - .90** .88** .04 .14 .17 .11 .14 
2. % O-HD .90** - .60** .06 .19* .20* .10 .16 
3. % O-LD .88** .57** - -.00 .06 .09 .09 .07 
4. BSI – NSI .02 .05 -.02 - .64** .62** .67** .90** 
5. BSI – DIR .14 .19* .04 .52** - .51** .49** .77** 
6. BSI – FSS .16 .20* .08 .40** .36** - .53** .79** 
7. BSI – ANX .11 .09 .10 .53** .34** .37** - .84** 
8. BSI – TOT .15 .18 .07 .81** .70** .69** .79** - 
Depression severity and age are partialled out in the correlations beneath the diagonal. 
%O = proportion observer memories retrieved during full AMT administration;%O-HD = proportion observer memories 
following high discrepant cues;%O-LD = proportion observer memories following low discrepant cues; BSI-NSI = negative 
self-image; BSI-DIR = difficult interpersonal relationships; BSI-FSS = failing social skills; BSI-ANX = anxiety; BSI-TOT = 
total BSI-score. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. 
Table 3 Correlations between depression severity (DASS-D), age, proportions observer 
memories in total and following high and low discrepant cues 
  2 3 4 5 
1. DASS-D -.11 .04 .04 .02 
2. Age - -.26** -.22** -.25** 
3. % O  - .90** .88** 
4. % O-HD   - .60** 
5. % O-LD    - 
DASS-D = depression severity;%O = proportion observer memories retrieved during full AMT administration;%O-HD = 
proportion observer memories following high discrepant cues;%O-LD = proportion observer memories following low 
discrepant cues. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. 
Further explorative analyses 
Table 1 includes the proportion of observer memories following HD and LD cues 
respectively. These proportions do not significantly differ, t = −.142, p = .888, nor do they 
differ from the proportion of observer memories retrieved irrespective of discrepancy (%O), t 
= −.278, p = .782, and t = .012, p = .991, for %O-HD and %O-LD versus %O, respectively. 
We further explored the associations between the total proportion of observer memories and 
separate BPD symptom clusters, as well as the relationships between the proportions of 
observer memories retrieved following high (HD) and low (LD) discrepant cues and the BSI 
dimensions. Results are presented in Table 2. All reported p-values (except the ones 
discussed in the previous section) were corrected for multiple testing using the Benjamini-
Hochberg’s method [35]. We found that observer perspective in the case of high discrepant 
cues (%O-HD) was prominently associated with BSI-FSS, r = .20, p < .05, and with 
‘Difficult Interpersonal Relationships’ (BSI-DIR), r = .19, p < .05. for BSI-FSS. These 
associations remained when controlling for age and depression severity, r = .20, and r = .19, 
respectively, both p < .05. No associations were found between BPD features and the 
proportion of observer memories following low discrepant cues (%O-LD). Given that these 
correlations are weak, we performed bootstrapping analyses in order to compute 95% 
confidence intervals around these correlations. Zero was never included in these intervals, 
95% CI’s range from .020 to .339, and from .027 to .357, for the associations between %O-
HD on the one hand and BSI-DIR and BSI-FSS on the other hand, respectively, both 
uncontrolled for age and depressive symptoms. When controlling for age and depressive 
symptoms, 95 CI’s range from .026 to .343, from .030 to .365, and from .018 to .333, for the 
associations between %O-HD on the one hand, and BSI-DIR, BSI-FSS, and BSI-total score 
on the other hand, respectively. Although these associations are weak, bootstrapping analyses 
suggest they are not trivial. 
Discussion 
In this paper we investigated the relationships between vantage perspective of memories, and 
BPD features. Contrary to our predictions, no association was found between the total 
proportion of observer memories retrieved and the total number of BPD symptoms reported. 
Moreover, additional exploratory analyses on the association between cue discrepancy and 
vantage perspective revealed that equal proportions of observer memories were retrieved in 
response high and low discrepant cues. At first sight, these data suggest that BPD patients do 
not more often adopt an observer perspective during recall compared to healthy controls. 
However, broadening our view to the role of cue discrepancy in relation to vantage 
perspective and BPD symptoms, we found that especially greater proportions of observer 
memories following high discrepant cues were associated with ‘Difficult Interpersonal 
Relationships’ and ‘Failing Social Skills’, even when we controlled for depressive symptoms 
and age. These findings suggest that an observer perspective would be more common in those 
who are less socially skilled. However, taking a closer look into the FSS-subscale of the BSI, 
we discovered that these items rather refer to anxious-neurotic behaviours that are often 
thought to be typical for cluster C personality disorders [4]. Example items are, e.g., “I never 
accomplish as much as I could”, “I am afraid of anything new”, “It is hard for me to make 
decisions”, “I feel that I can not run my own life”, and “I feel uneasy in crowds, such as when 
I am shopping or at a movie”a. We therefore conclude that, besides difficult interpersonal 
relationships, cluster C type behaviours, rather than failing social skills, are associated with 
higher proportions of observer memories. This is in line with previous findings in (recurrent) 
depressed patients [6,14,15], who are known to hold higher dispositions on Neuroticism [36]. 
With respect to anxiety disorders, on the other hand, who also are considered to be more 
neurotic, the picture is less clear: Patients with different anxiety diagnosis differ in the 
perspective they adopt while retrieving memories [37]. In addition, since higher scores on 
FSS may also represent low self-esteem, our findings contradict the ones of Libby, Valenti, 
Pfent, and Eibach [38], who found no association between self-esteem and vantage 
perspective during recall. 
Nevertheless, these findings potentially support the idea that high discrepant information may 
induce a tendency to compare, which is often associated with an observer mode [14]. 
According to another line of research, high discrepant cues also complicate the retrieval of 
memories on the content level [28,39-42]. Traumatised as well as (previously) depressed 
patients show a tendency to retrieve categories of events (e.g., ‘each time I went abroad for 
my job’) rather than memories referring to specific events that happened only once and did 
not take longer than one day (e.g., ‘that one time in that Steak house in Toronto’). This is 
referred to as overgeneral memory (OGM; for an overview, see: [1,43]). It is assumed that 
resources that are used during an intentional search process are taken away in favour of 
processes that aim to maintain a stable self-concept whenever the risk exists that painful 
memories will be reactivated. Moreover, it is assumed that the recall of overgeneral 
memories would be facilitated when respondents are explicitly asked to retrieve memories 
that are consistent with self-discrepant domains [42]. For instance, a depressed individual that 
is asked to retrieve a specific memory in response to the cue word ‘happy’, will be more 
likely to refer to a category of events. Together with this line of reasoning, our results seem to 
suggest that a threatened self-concept thus might promote both the adoption of observer 
memories and the retrieval of overgeneral memories. 
Yet, it should be noted that these correlations are weak, only explaining up to 4% of the other 
variable’s variance. Bootstrapping procedures, though, showed these associations are not 
trivial, but replications are recommended to heighten the validity of our findings. 
Alternatively, broadening the view on imagery perspective to non-clinical subjects, the 
framework of Libby and Eibach [13] contradicts the above mentioned theories which both 
suggest that an observer perspective serves a dampening function. This model is built upon 
the widespread idea that the self is dual-faceted: One facet considers experiential awareness, 
the other conceptual knowledge. Whereas the first is fed by environmental features and 
concrete actions related to it, the latter consists of abstract meaning structures, defining the 
coherence of a self over time. According to Libby and Eibach [13], the perspective one 
adopts while retrieving memories, depends mainly on how one conceptualises the life event 
in relation to the facets of their self, and not, as hypothesised by the functional avoidance 
hypothesis, on the negative valence of the event for the individual. The adoption of a field 
perspective is assumed to address the experiential self, because this perspective evokes 
concrete features of a situation. An observer memory, on the other hand, would lead people to 
frame that event in a broader context, e.g., one’s self-beliefs, or in relation to other significant 
events. Difficult, self-discrepant memories are generally considered as highly relevant for 
one’s long-term self, and are more likely to be retrieved using an observer perspective. 
However, memories that emphasise the continuity in one’s self-concept may also be 
important in terms of the broader context of one’s life, and may therefore also been retrieved 
from an observer’s point of view. Moreover, the authors suggest that the adoption of an 
observer perspective also has the potential to intensify emotional reactions: “Third-person 
imagery increases emotional response relative to first-person imagery when the meaning of 
an event in the broader context of one’s life evokes a stronger emotional response than does 
the experience of the concrete details. However, when considering the meaning of an event in 
the broader context of one’s life evokes a weaker emotional response than does focusing on 
the concrete experience, third-person imagery should reduce emotional responses.” [38], p. 
209–2010. Unfortunately, our data do not allow to properly study these theoretical 
considerations, because we neglected to inventory the personal relevancy and/or the 
emotionality of the memories retrieved. We recommend that future studies would take these 
extra variables into account, in order to further distinguish between the possible functions of 
vantage perspective (dampening vs comparing vs meaning in life). 
Our findings further suggest that, besides cluster C type behaviours, especially interpersonal 
BPD symptoms are associated with more observer memories. No clear cut explanations are 
available for these specific associations, although we speculate that empathy may be a key 
concept in attempts to clarify this relationship. Empathy, once defined as “the capacity to 
understand and respond to the unique affective experiences of another person” [44], p. 54 is 
generally assumed to be beneficial for interpersonal relationships. However, in relation to 
BPD, Krohn [45] identified the so-called ‘borderline empathy paradox’. The paradox refers to 
the combination of seemingly enhanced empathic capabilities (see [46] for an overview) with 
impaired interpersonal functioning in BPD patients. Indeed, recent findings [47] suggest that 
BPD patients have increased levels of affective empathy (‘sensing another’s feelings’ [48]: 
emotion recognition, emotional contagion) and decreased levels of cognitive empathy 
(perspective taking, theory of mind). More specifically, it is argued that BPD patients more 
intensely feel the other person’s feelings (i.e., higher levels of emotional contagion), and that 
they miss the higher-order cognitive empathy skills to cope with these intense feelings. 
Additionally, the intense feelings are presumable by the same mechanisms of emotional 
contagion reflected in the observer, resulting in mutual personal distress. We speculate that 
repetitive experiences of mutual personal distress would undermine the quality of the 
relationships. In addition, we further speculate that BPD patients, characterised by an 
unstable sense of self, probably eagerly tune in on all surrounded interpersonal stimuli they 
can find in order to create a sense of identity and safety. Their dysfunctional empathy system 
may be, at least in part, a maintaining element in their stable sense of self-instability. Of 
course, we are aware that a lot of speculations are formulated above that need further 
investigation. For instance, in relation to empathy, we talk about perspective taking in 
general, while in our and other studies vantage perspective during recall was questioned. 
Also, correlational research falls short in examining the causal relationships that are predicted 
above. Future research should try to reveal the true relations between these different kinds of 
imagery and all the hypothesised associations mentioned above. 
Nevertheless, we underline that data were administered in a community sample, and not in a 
group of BPD patients. We need to be careful generalizing these (correlational) findings in 
our non-clinical sample to a clinical population, especially because the BSI-distributions are 
positively skewed and given that the associations found are weak, only explaining up to 4% 
of each other’s variance. Furthermore, we did not collect information on other aspects that 
can influence the AM characteristics of interest, such as traumatic experiences, posttraumatic 
symptoms, and medication use. Finally, cue discrepancy was not determined on a personal 
level, and with disregard of the clinical sample of interest (since the cues we used were 
judged to be discrepant for depressed patients, and not for BPD patients). Even so, we 
neglected to inventory other potentially interesting autobiographical memory variables 
(personal relevancy, emotionality, the extent to which a recalled memory is consistent with 
the presented cue), of which theorizing would benefit. Future research should therefore not 
only investigate whether it is possible to replicate the current findings in a clinical sample of 
BPD patients, but should also incorporate these extra variables to test the interesting 
hypotheses formulated above. 
Interpersonal difficulties and problems with one’s self-concept are core features of BPD, 
causing a great deal of the burden of patients and their surroundings. Therefore, future studies 
should also explore the potential connections between (lack of aspects of) empathy, social 
impairments, vantage point, and dissociation. It has been suggested earlier [49] that 
dissociation is a highly defensive act in which all feelings are switched off. Rice and Rubin 
[50] suggested that vantage perspective would be more ecologically validly measured using a 
continuous scale, ranging from field to observer perspective. It could be hypothesised that 
dissociation is at the end of the scale, near observer perspective, since it can be considered the 
ultimate avoidance strategy. It thus would be interesting to find out how dissociative 
experiences relate to the quality of interpersonal experiences, and autobiographical mental 
imagery. 
Conclusions 
To conclude then, and notwithstanding the above mentioned limitations, our findings are the 
first to our knowledge to suggest that vantage perspective during retrieval may be associated 
with BPD symptoms when cues activate domains that are highly discrepant towards the 
actual self. 
Endnotes 
aVan den Wyngaert [51] acknowledges that this factor mainly consists of anxious-neurotic 
symptoms. However, he reasoned that all these symptoms could be thought as examples or 
consequences of inadequate social skills. Therefore, he chose to name the scale ‘Failing 
Social Skills’. 
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